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Abstract 
That sovereignty is losing its importance within international politics is a commonly 
occurring claim. When adopted by realists it is used as describing the end of an era where 
predictions of state behaviour were easily made. When concluded by liberalists, it is seen as 
marking the transit to a new era where the view on an international system as defined by 
cooperation due to common interests. This essay will examine the way we look at sovereignty 
today in order to find an alternative explanation to the above mentioned competing views. Is it 
possible to use a model to describe sovereignty in all its complexity or will we have to accept 
that it is a constructed concept which will never truly be definable?  
By focusing on the sanctions imposed by the EU towards Russia due to the Ukraine conflict, 
this essay will take a stance on a framework developed by Stephen Krasner, dividing 
sovereignty into four categories: Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, legal 
international sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. The purpose is to examine to what 
extent this model provides a reliable explanation for sovereignty in an international context. 
By analysing the rhetoric used by the EU in explaining the situation in Ukraine, the idea of 
the importance of a national identity will also be added into the discussion. Concluding that 
Krasner’s model fails to take into account all dimensions of the concept of sovereignty, a 
suggestion will be made that we do also take into consideration social sovereignty. 
Key words: sovereignty, EU, the Ukraine conflict, national identity, social sovereignty, 
Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, legal international sovereignty, 
interdependence sovereignty 
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Introduction 
On March 1, the first Russian convoy entered Ukrainian territory. Since then, events has 
passed that has caused several national and international actors, one of them being the 
European Union, to impose sanctions. (CIA, 2014) This puts us in the presence of a few basic, 
but nevertheless extremely important, questions. What causes these actors to react? What 
ideas of state sovereignty lies behind it? And why has this view become universal within 
Western IR? These questions do not make up my main research questions. They do however 
provide a worthy entrance to the topic which I seek to explain.  
It has been claimed by several theorists that national sovereignty is becoming less important. 
Realists predicts the end of an era where national autonomy has a decreased significance. 
Liberalists believe that globalisation is resulting in borders becoming less important. 
Constructivist claim that sovereignty is merely a socially constructed concept, impossible to 
define or to measure. Will we have to accept that it is a constructed concept which will never 
truly be definable? Or is sovereignty only a complex concept possible to analyse with the use 
of a model?  
Purpose 
The general purpose of my paper is to look at the concept of sovereignty and the broad debate 
on that examines and constitutes it. Although having differed historically, today’s new ideas 
of the role of the nation-state are rising simultaneously with these traditional conceptions. 
This has led to a discussion that is often caught between two main camps: that it is changing 
due to globalisation, or that it is undefinable. I wish to step away from such set predictions 
and analyse whether it is it is possible to offer a reasonable explanation by using a general 
model. In order to do so, I will use the framework developed by Stephen Krasner dividing 
sovereignty into four different categories. Generally accepted by scholars of international 
relations, I wish to apply them to an up-to-date case in order to see if there are dimensions that 
need to be added or if the model is providing an enough explanation.  
I will exemplify this model on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. More specifically, I would like 
to investigate the sanctions enforced by the European Union towards Russia due to the 
Ukraine conflict and what these thoughts can tell us about Krasner’s ideas about sovereignty. 
I will mainly focus on the rhetoric used by the EU as I believe that this can be generalised into 
an idea about state behaviour within the Western international system. Analysing the 
interaction between two nations and an international organisation will provide two separate 
type of actors with quite distinct views on sovereignty, which will facilitate my analysis. I 
believe that it is not only possible but highly necessary to connect reality and moral theory in 
order to ask whether the discussions that we have of states, of sovereignty and of the 
international system, are representative. 
The reason for choosing the Ukraine conflict as a mean of displaying the dilemma of 
sovereignty within international relations might seem far-fetched. I am convinced that is not 
the case. Empirically, the Ukraine conflict displays a modern case of an ancient dilemma 
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about how the ideas of national autonomy and security can and should be combined. 
Theoretically, the concept of sovereignty is fascinating, partly since it is constantly modified 
as a result of the ongoing change that globalisation inevitably causes, but also in terms of its 
hegemonic status within international relations. Adding the EU into the equation, therefore, 
shows the complicity of sovereignty in times of globalisation.  
Main question 
My main research question is the following: 
1. Does the model by Stephen Krasner provide a reliable framework for understanding 
the role that sovereignty plays regarding the sanctions imposed by the EU in the 
Ukraine conflict?  
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Methodology 
To seek to explain reality ceteris paribus, that is with all intervening factors held constant, 
might be the aim of a political economist. I do however not assume that an objective 
epistemology is at all times possible to reach, whereas I will put extra effort into making the 
process of this study as transparent and clear as possible. My goal is that every reader, 
although disagreeing with the choices I make, will be fully aware of how and why these were 
made. Intersubjectivity, therefore, is in my opinion not about other researchers to come to the 
same conclusions that I do, but to be able to. 
Structure 
This essay will follow the subsequent structure: 
1) Introduction of sovereignty 
2) Textual analysis and empirical case 
3) Discussion and model evaluation 
Step 1 will be carried out in the Background, in which the concept of sovereignty will be 
introduced. It will take into account the traditional ideas along with the critique that has been 
directed towards it. The purpose of this part of the paper is to explain the institutionalization 
of sovereignty and to show how it, as a concept, has developed over time. A modern 
redefinition of sovereignty, based on a model of Stephen Krasner, will then be presented. His 
division into four categories of sovereignty will constitute a framework for categorizing EU’s 
view on state supremacy in step 2 and will also make up a large part of my discussion. 
Step 2 has a mainly systemizing ambition, which means that the purpose is to 1) logically 
range the content into easily reviewable classifications in order to 2) show the structure of 
thoughts that provide the origin of a certain action or idea (Beckman, 2012, p. 211). This 
means that the ambition of this part of my essay is mainly descriptive (Eemeren, 2014, p. 7). 
It is in this step I will apply the model provided by Krasner on the case that I have chosen to 
look into. I will start by providing a brief introduction in which the background of the Ukraine 
conflict will be displayed in a timeline. This is meant to provide a basic understanding if what 
events that has led to the Ukraine conflict, but should not be seen as a complete explanation to 
it. 
In order to clearly display the arguments used by the EU, I have preformed an argument 
analysis. In such an analysis, interpretations might be made that are not explicitly written and 
thus require a reading of the arguments that are implicitly expressed. (Boréus & Bergström, 
2005, p. 115) To reveal them, that is to make them explicit, is called an abstract process 
(Eemeren, 2014) and is something that I believe is necessary in order to understand what 
implicit implication are being made by the EU. In that way, they can also be a part of my 
analysis. The arguments of this analysis will be presented, whereas the actual analysis will be 
featured as an appendix. The purpose of this step is to look at the context in which 
sovereignty is used by the EU.  
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In order to separate the different arguments, I will divide them into and compare them to the 
four types of sovereignty introduced in the Background. By doing so, I hope to rely on earlier 
research that will be helpful for me when discussing my results. An important remark to make 
here is that the ideas displayed in the official EU documents will not necessarily display the 
actual arguments behind the use of sanctions within the EU. This is the classic dilemma of a 
textual analysis: we cannot be certain that it will be explicitly expressed. The result of the 
analysis will therefore be accompanied by other historically relevant dimensions.  
Finally, in step 3 I will discuss my results in the light of the background on sovereignty and 
the model used in my empirical case. In this part, I will combine my results with the theory 
introduced. I wish to evaluate the way we look at the concept of sovereignty and suggest a 
somewhat different approach that might be helpful in explaining events like the one that I 
have looked into, thus contributing to the general debate.  
Material 
The argument analysis of this essay will be fully based on the official document “Council 
Decision 2014/145/CFSP” published by the European Union. Additional information that is 
used as a basis for my analysis will also be gathered mainly from primary sources. In doing 
so, I wish to reduce the risk of misinterpretations common when such a source is interpreted 
by a secondary source. (Esaiasson, et al., 2007, p. 319) 
Definitions and distinctions 
In the official document/s published by the EU which this essay is based on, the entering of 
Russian military in Ukraine is not rarely described as “infractions of Ukrainian territory”, 
which is a term that I have chosen to use when presenting these texts. However, this should 
not be seen as me stating a position. Similarly, the entering of Russian military into Ukraine 
will here be explained as the “Ukrainian conflict”, thereby stating that it is a problematic 
situation that cannot be considered normal for the every-day life and politics of Ukraine. 
Since the purpose of this essay is not to condemn either party or to take a stand, a normative 
discussion will not be held. However, because of the harm made on the people of Ukraine due 
to the entering of foreign armed forces (OCHA, 2014) the events will in this essay be referred 
to and be considered a “conflict”.  
The shortening of the European Union into the EU will be used throughout the essay. Other 
synonyms, such as the Union, will also occur. Additional terms that will be used 
synonymously due to a matter of simplification are the following: 
International relations - IR 
State supremacy - state sovereignty 
Sanctions – restrictive measures  
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Background: sovereignty 
"To interfere in the government of another, in whatever way indeed that may be done is 
opposed to the natural liberty of nations, by virtue of which one is altogether independent 
of the will of other nations in its action". - Christian Wolff (Krasner, 2001, p. 232) 
 
As any other theoretical understanding about reality, sovereignty is an ideological concept. In 
other words it contains a basic notion about the human nature and about freedom (Dagger & 
Ball, 2011, p. 8). Similarly, “[i]nternational relations theory depends on conceptions of how 
the individual functions in society and in the state” (Grant, 1991, p. 9). Claiming the 
naturalness of a certain condition means demanding that this specific condition should be seen 
as a standard, as an unquestionable truth. This also results in a rejection of other, 
contradictory, views. Within Western international relations theory, individual behaviour 
within society and the state has seen as representative for state behaviour. (Grant, 1991, p. 9) 
Hence, theories about mankind have been generalized to theories about states, and later on to 
theories about IR. 
The State of Nature 
The concept of sovereignty can be traced back to the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century theorists Jean 
Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. They defined state supremacy as absolute domestic power 
(Krasner, 2001, p. 21), a definition that is often, if not always, drawn back to the 1648 
Westphalian treaty. (Osiander, 2001, pp. 60-61) This notion of sovereignty is based on the 
Hobbesian thought of the “State of Nature”, an idea that is still today influencing the modern 
view on domestic sovereignty. (Armitage, 2013, p. 59) Hobbes work gave way for two 
perceptions: that the law of nature consists of fearful and competitive actors and that this law 
of nature also applies to the international system. Hence, on the international arena states are 
fearful and competitive actors. (Armitage, 2013, p. 67)  
Despite this definition, Hobbes did not describe IR as an anarchic system, (Armitage, 2013, p. 
71) but as a state where actors are pursued by self-interests and therefore will act according to 
those; (Beitz, 1979, p. 51) “men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they 
are in that condition that is called Warre” (Hobbes in Grant, 1991, pp. 9-10). John Locke 
disagreed with the Hobbesian thought that the act of individuals can be compared to the act of 
states. (Beitz, 1979, p. 52) Locke was of the opinion that except in times of certain 
circumstances, such as ongoing conflicts, people have common interest that will bind them 
together. Consequently, Locke did not equate the law of nature with the law of nations. 
Instead, he claimed that the latter was just a suitable simplification of reality. (Armitage, 
2013, p. 80)  
Hence, Hobbes State of Nature is primarily a theory of the behaviour of states. As Bull (2002, 
p. 3) points out, his theory is based on the assumption that actors perform out of fear. The 
pattern which we can distinguish of insecure actors in times of war is however not 
characteristic for their behaviour at all times. Therefore, Bull states, Hobbes theory does not 
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apply on the international system in order but rather of it in disorder. Due to the 
institutionalization of the Hobbesian view, international relations has been predominantly 
concerned with warfare. (Beitz, 1979, p. vii) It might however be about time for us to rethink 
our view on sovereignty in terms of war and a State of Nature. (Beitz, 1987, p. 40) Charles 
Beitz states that comparing states with people in order to explain their rationality is 
problematic. Applying the State of Nature into international relations would mean replacing 
states with people representing different citizenships. This comparison fails, Beitz argues, 
since it is not possible to equalize the interest of a nation with the interest of a person. (Beitz, 
1979, p. 54) 
This is based on the principle of non-intervention, namely the (right to) lack of interference of 
other states
1
. (Beitz, 1979, pp. 65-66) The exact meaning of non-intervention differs from the 
just described wide-range definition to a more restrictive one, stating that “intervention is a 
policy carried out by a government, aimed at changing the structure of political authority in 
another state against its will, using military force”. It is disputed whether non-military actions 
aiming towards political or economic change, such as sanctions or aid, should be seen as 
interventions. Including such measures would widen the definition of non-intervention into 
“inducing a government to change a particular policy against its will, at altering the balance of 
power between competing groups or classes, or at producing a change in the structure of 
economic activity within a state”. (Beitz, 1979, pp. 72-73) 
Non-intervention can not only be criticized based on the exercise of interference without 
consent, basically because the state itself is built upon the same principle of interference 
towards persons. As we know, interfering with the autonomy of its citizens does not make a 
state domestically illegitimate. This provides the link between state autonomy and state 
legitimacy: one does not constitute, or require, the other. (Beitz, 1979, pp. 79-80) Hence, 
Beitz claim that people should be seen as autonomous
2
 and that for that reason, states should 
not. (Beitz, 1979, p. 81) 
The Treaty of Westphalia 
Few would disagree with the statement that the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which is seen as a 
declaration of the secularisation between a threatening (Christian) empire and the sovereign 
state, provides a benchmark in the history of state supremacy. (Osiander, 2001, p. 252) Its 
importance was taken into account during the 19
th
 century where it was claimed to have 
inspired Hobbes and his distinction of domestic sovereignty as positive law and foreign 
sovereignty as the law of nature. (Armitage, 2013, p. 73) Whereas the former can be described 
as state autonomy, that is the state as the only legitimate ruling authority, the latter is best 
explained in terms of geographic boundaries. (Krasner, 1995-1996, pp. 115-116)  
                                                 
 
1
 Which is comparable to Stephen Krasner’s definition of Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner, 2001, p. 232), , see 
“Sovereignty redefined” 
2
 “[A]s sources of ends” (Beitz, 1979, p. 81). 
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However, Hobbes did not make a distinction between internal and external sovereignty 
(Armitage, 2013, p. 73). This separation between national and international sovereignty was 
made later on and allowed a theoretical discussion about an international system and, hence, 
international relations to prosper (Bull, 2002, p. 8). It was not until the 19
th
 and beginning of 
the 20
th
 century, when an international consensus on describing IR as anarchic had been 
established, that Hobbes thoughts were truly taken into account. As soon as it did, the 
“anarchic consensus” was a fact. (Armitage, 2013, p. 70) The reading of Hobbes has therefore 
been described as a relative adoption where the details suitable for the present paradigm has 
been chosen whereas other, less appropriate, thoughts has been ignored. Consequently, a fixed 
misinterpretation of his work has laid the grounds for the modern history of sovereignty. 
(Armitage, 2013, p. 71) 
The above mention claim, together with the myth of Hobbes view on the international system 
as anarchic and additional incorrect assertions related to the Westphalian Peace
3
, created the 
“myth of 1648”. (Armitage, 2013, p. 73) This view explains how this myth of the the 
Westphalian Treaty has been established within Western IR: it “fits perfectly with the 
accepted view of what international relations is about, or at least has ‘traditionally’ been 
about” as it provides a suitable description of war, territory and sovereignty. (Osiander, 2001, 
p. 266) The disagreement, brought forward by post-sovereignty on the before uncontested 
ideas of sovereignty, has come to redefine history as well as introducing new definitions of 
state supremacy. (Armitage, 2013, pp. 73-74)  
In summary, sovereignty is a term that has been coined within IR, and even though few 
theorists today would describe it as natural, it is part of a ruling paradigm. Consequently, is 
has created the idea about the nation-state as “a sovereign, self-governing political unit that 
binds together and expresses the feelings and needs of a single nation” (Ball & Dagger, 2011, 
p. 13). 
Sovereignty redefined 
In the light of the above mentioned critique on the history of sovereignty, Stephen Krasner 
has come up with four different categorisations meant to redefine the traditional simplified 
view on sovereignty. He argues that traditionally, discussing sovereignty has mainly been 
done in these four different ways. The first of them is the control of a state within its territorial 
boundaries, a view of sovereignty similar to Hobbes. The second has handled cross-border 
control such as the ability of a state to control the flow of people, goods and financial assets. 
Whereas sovereignty loss in terms of the first form of sovereignty could be exemplified as a 
ruler’s or national institutions’ inability to control domestic activities, the second form is 
rather defined by a nation’s inability to regulate these movements. (Krasner, 1995-1996, p. 
118) 
                                                 
 
3
 Osiander explain 
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The third way has been understood as the certain rights of an independent state, such as 
entering into agreements, in the same way as an individual has its legal rights. Last but not 
least, the Westphalian model has externalized the view on autonomy that is vital for the 
supremacy of a nation within its borders. That is, in contrast to the first view, the Westphalian 
view has rather been about the right to rule without interference from other states. A state 
could therefore have territorial autonomy based on the international agreement of non-
intervention without for that matter being able to regulate the institutions and/or people within 
it. The European Union, being an international organisation, is not included in the 
Westphalian model as it has authority structures that crosses national boundaries. (Krasner, 
1995-1996, p. 119) 
Consequently, Krasner divide state supremacy into four categories: interdependence 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty and legal sovereignty (Krasner, 
2001, p. 231), where interdependence sovereignty and legal sovereignty is sometimes 
compiled into international legal sovereignty. Together, the latter two are explained as a 
territorial area which is juridically independent in the matter that it can sign treaties as well as 
reach agreements with other states, international organisations and institutions. (Krasner, 
2005, pp. 70-71) When separated, interdependence sovereignty regards the ability of states’ to 
regulate border movements. Hence is refers to state control rather than authority. Legal 
sovereignty is about juridical recognition of the right of freedom to every state. Whereas legal 
sovereignty is merely about authority, therefore, interdependence sovereignty is more about 
state control. (Krasner, 2001, p. 231 & 233) 
Domestic sovereignty is related to the ideas described by classical theorists Bodin and 
Hobbes. It refers to the authoritative legitimacy of a state within its borders. (Krasner, 2001, 
p. 231) Westphalian sovereignty is about state control in regards to other states’, such as the 
idea of state independence and non-intervention, but also about the state monopoly on 
exercising power domestically. As expressed in its name this is the part of sovereignty that is 
mainly traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia. (Krasner, 2001, p. 232)  
 
 
Figure 1 
  
Westphalian soveriegnty 
Legal sovereiegnty 
Domestic sovereiegnty 
Interdependence sovereiegnty 
Authority 
Control 
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Theory: the societal dimension 
Christopher Rudolph argues that in order to explain the emergence and development of 
sovereignty in the Western World, the idea of a national identity must be included in the 
discussion.  Rudolph is critical of how the debate about sovereignty tend to assume that the 
concept itself is losing its importance due to a changing world when it is in fact our idea of 
sovereignty that is shifting – and always has. The concept of sovereignty, he claims, is loosely 
defined and thus allowing states to use it as a foreign policy tool. Due to this, Rudolph believe 
that measuring sovereignty in terms of the loss of agreed authoritative power due to 
globalisation is meaningless. He states that as long as the development for advanced industrial 
economies will benefit economically from constraining their decisive power we cannot talk 
about decreased sovereignty. Such changes, he argues, are optional and as long as such losses 
are made by choice, a declined sovereignty cannot be claimed. (Rudolph, 2005, pp. 2-3) Only 
by including national identity into the picture there can be a proper debate about the changing 
concept of sovereignty. 
Rudolph explains how historically, the notion of national identity emerged when the power 
shifted from a single sovereign individual, such as a monarch, and became collective during 
the 18
th
 century. As many European countries became democracies, the people was further 
connected with the country in which they lived. As national security evolved as a way of 
protecting the territory of the nation-state, joining the military became the most patriotic act 
for citizens within it. In combination with 18
th
 and 19
th
 century imperialism, the ideas of a 
national identity were spread as well as strengthened. Thus a connection between sovereignty, 
territory and the national identity had emerged and spread, which meant an increased interest 
in national security. (Rudolph, 2005, pp. 5-6) This view on a single nation and its need to be 
protected gave way for what Rudolph defines as three different ways of security: geopolitical, 
material and societal. (Rudolph, 2005, p. 7) 
During the 17
th
 throughout 19
th
 centuries, security in terms of maintained national sovereignty 
was most and foremost reached through conquests. This maximized both the material and 
societal wealth of the imperialist countries. In the middle of the 19
th
 century, geopolitical 
security gained increased and in parallel with the increased economic costs for military 
security, the idea of export and comparative advantages was introduced, making the 
accumulation of material power through trans-border flows the most important. (Rudolph, 
2005, p. 7)  
Today, there is a strong linkage between the material and societal security, namely the way 
states ensure the high living standard and domestic economic prosperity in order to keep a 
societal order and satisfaction. The development of sovereignty in terms of material wealth, 
namely transnational trade and exchange, meant a change of the territorial and societal 
sovereignty. Due to social insecurity, trading unions where free movements came to allow one 
type of (internal) flow while excluding another (external) one. This development, therefore, 
was accompanied by other restrictions. This is a classic example of how countries benefit 
from letting some of their authoritative power go by gaining on economic trade, something he 
calls “sovereignty bargaining”. (Rudolph, 2005, pp. 8, 10-11) 
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Rudolph highlights that sovereignty bargaining is not seen the same way for all type of flows. 
Whereas the flow of capital and goods is one thing, the flow of people is seen to change the 
national identity. Migration flows, therefore, tend to be seen in terms of type rather than 
volume (Rudolph, 2005, p. 9) and citizenship becomes the link between the state and the 
people, namely the domestic sovereignty. This creates a turn from the different dimensions of 
sovereignty to the object of sovereignty: the national identity. (Rudolph, 2005, p. 13)When 
speaking of identity, Rudolph which to separate the societal security and the societal 
sovereignty. Societal security is about a homogenous, cultural dichotomy between us and 
them, concretized by borders as a way of deciding who is and is not a part of a certain 
community. This however assumes a homogeneity that can be kept in a static condition. 
Identities on the other hand are in constant change due to internal and external conditions, 
making up social sovereignty. Thus social sovereignty is focused on (sustaining) a certain 
national identity whereas social security is focused on (eliminating) the cultural and ethnic 
change that contribute to such a change. Understanding sovereignty, therefore, is not possible 
without including social sovereignty. (Rudolph, 2005, pp. 14-15)  
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Case study: sovereignty and the EU 
“Sanctions are not a question of retaliation; they are a foreign policy tool. Not a goal in 
themselves, but a means to an end. Our goal is to stop Russian action against Ukraine, to 
restore Ukraine's sovereignty and [to] […] engage in a meaningful dialogue involving 
Ukraine and Russia”. - Herman Van Rompuy (Council of the European Union, 2014) 
 
When presenting the traditional thoughts on sovereignty it is soon clear that they are merely 
ideas about reality. For example, Krasner (1995-96, p. 115) describes how “[t]he Westphalian 
model has never been more than a reference point or a convention; it has never been some 
deeply confining structure from which actors could not escape”. Despite this, it has managed 
to become one of the cornerstones of todays’ view on state supremacy. In this part of my 
essay, I will look at what views on state sovereignty is being used by the EU in the Ukraine 
conflict. To determine the traditional views on sovereignty I will use Krasner definitions’ of 
sovereignty as interdependence sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty 
and legal sovereignty. As Krasner (2001, p. 233) himself states, “[s]overeignty is a basket of 
goods that do not necessarily go together”. Thus, the arguments presented by the EU might 
correspond to all of Krasner’s definitions’ but it may also just fit into one – or none – of them. 
This part of the essay will therefore outline how the EU legitimates their sanctions towards 
Russia due to the Ukraine conflict. Figuring this out, I hope to answer a larger question in this 
context, namely what view the EU has on Ukrainian sovereignty. 
Historical timeline on Ukraine 
In 1991, Ukraine gained independence from the USSR in an unstable parliamentary and 
economic state. This lead to the peaceful protests of the Orange Revolution in 2004. In 2012. 
Ukraine was criticized by the Western world due to unjust funding of election participants. 
(CIA, 2014) In November 2013 President Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mykola 
Azarov abandoned ongoing negotiations with the EU regarding an agreement on collaboration 
and trade. Due to closer economic ties with Russia, Ukraine instead demanded a deal in which 
negotiations between EU, Ukraine and Russia would be held. The EU refused - claiming that 
it was a bilateral agreement – and short after that major protests evolved in Ukraine, creating 
what the EU describes as the worst Ukrainian political crisis since 1991. (The European 
Parliament 1, 2014, pp. 14-15) 
 
As a reaction of discontent, Ukrainians presented their discontent by occupying the centre of 
Kiev in three months’ time. The protesters were met with violent methods from the 
authorities, a behaviour that got condemned internationally. In February, Yanukovych 
1991 
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Revolution 
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travelled to Russia and a new election was planned to be held on May 25
th
. However, in 
March, Russian forces annexed Crimea, an action that both Ukraine itself and the European 
Union stated as illegal. Two weeks later, Russia proclaimed a referendum meant to decide 
whether or not Crimea would become a part of Russia, a vote that was proclaimed as 
illegitimate by several international authorities such as the US, the EU and the UN and by 
Ukraine itself. (CIA, 2014)  
The use of sanctions towards Russia 
On March 3rd 2014, the Council of the European Union called for sanctions towards Russia 
“to protect the unity and territorial integrity of [Ukraine]” because of “the clear violation of 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity”. (Council of the European Union, 2014) On 
March 6, the EU member states condemned the Russian Federation for entering Ukrainian 
territory with armed forces and agreed on demanding that Russia withdrew its armed forces. 
Furthermore, it was decided that the referendum organized by Russia regarding the future of 
Crimea should be considered illegal. As a solution to the conflict, the member states 
demanded that negotiations be held between Ukrainian and Russian governments. Until a 
solution was reached, the EU decided to suspend bilateral conversations and to compile a 
new, revised, agreement with Russia to replace the existing Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. In parallel, travel restrictions and freezing of assets towards the natural people 
responsible for actions which were considered to have contributed in enhancing the conflict 
was conducted. (The Council of the European Union, 2014, p. 16) 
Since Russian military annexed Crimea, it has been defined as a “territory temporarily 
occupied by the Russian Federation” by the Ukrainian government. (The European Parliament 
2, 2014, p. 19) On March 17, the official document regarding restrictive measures towards 
Russia was released by the Council of the European Union. It stressed the importance of 
imposing sanctions towards Russia due to the outburst of the conflict in Ukraine. These 
initiating sanctions were introduced through the asset freezing and visa ban of 21 people in 
Russia. These targeted measures were described by the EU as mainly symbolic (The 
European Parliament 3, 2014) and meant to ensure a “stable, prosperous and democratic 
future for all Ukraine's citizens”. (The European Union, n.d.)  
Looking at the rhetoric used by the EU provides a broad understanding on how they justify 
imposing these sanctions towards Russia. The main claim made by the EU is that Russia has 
acted in dissidence with international rules. The premise is that it is the role of the EU to 
condemn this behaviour by supporting and by protecting Ukraine. This statement is not 
written in the text itself, but is a necessary assumption to make in order to accept the main 
claim. Thus if it is not seen as the role of the EU to condemn such behaviour, their sanctions 
could never be justified
4
. This is interesting considering the fact that the EU has decided to act 
                                                 
 
4
 Disagreeing with this assumption would thus mean that there is no justification for EU to act on the matter, 
which would mean that the main claim made by the EU would be voided. This is in argumentation theory called 
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on defending a country which is not a part of their own union, something that will be further 
discussed in the next section. The use of sanctions is by the EU explained by the fact that 
Russia entered Ukraine as an unprovoked action. The main reason for why the EU should act 
on the actions of Russia is therefore the belief that as a nation, Russia has acted immorally 
and in dissidence with international rules and norms. The argument supporting this belief is 
basically the fact that Russia has broken the concept of national sovereignty. This can be 
divided into two sub arguments, namely the two ways in which Ukrainian sovereignty has 
been violated: 1) by territory and 2) by independence.  
Focusing on the territorial dimension of the conflict is mainly compatible with what Krasner 
refers to as Westphalian sovereignty. The violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine refers 
to the de facto entry of Russia and is supported by the sub argument that this was done by 
Russian armed forces. In other words, by leading military into Ukrainian territory, Russia is 
seen to have violated the rule of non-intervention. The rule of non-intervention is without a 
doubt the most typical example of Westphalian sovereignty. This means that the violation of 
the territorial integrity of Ukraine is also a violation of the Westphalian sovereignty of 
Ukraine. The argument supporting this claim is the one stating that Russia has gone into 
Ukraine with armed forces and thereby threatened the Ukrainian sovereignty de facto. To 
accept this argument, one must also accept the premise that in this specific situation, violence 
is not a fair means of communication. 
Moreover, the EU claims that Russia has threatened the independence of Ukraine. This claim 
relies on the fact that Russia advertised a referendum in Crimea, an action that contradicted 
Ukrainian law. It can therefore be discussed whether Russia threatened what Krasner refers to 
as the domestic sovereignty or if it is in fact a matter of Westphalian sovereignty. After all, 
Westphalian sovereignty is besides the territorial aspect also described by Krasner as the state 
monopoly on exercising power domestically. Since the referendum clearly questioned the 
Ukrainian government, therefore, it was foremost a threat towards the Westphalian 
sovereignty of Ukraine. The unspoken premise here is what such a loss of sovereignty could 
lead to, namely the loss of the authoritative legitimacy of Ukraine. Since this is a definition of 
domestic sovereignty, we can conclude that the inability for the Ukrainian government to 
control domestic activities is mainly a sign of decreased Westphalian sovereignty, but partly 
also a future risk for decreased domestic sovereignty. In combination with the physical 
entering of Russian forces into Ukraine and hence the loss of Westphalian sovereignty, 
therefore, the conflict seems to have mainly interfered with Ukraine’s domestic and 
Westphalian sovereignty.  
Although giving us a fairly representative idea of the conflict, the by the EU enhanced 
arguments explaining the reason for them imposing sanctions does not cover the entire 
dilemma of the situation. As I just concluded, it seems that the official explanation is mostly 
representative for what Krasner refers to as Westphalian sovereignty. Since condemning 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the critical question, which means that disagreeing with a premise means disagreeing with the argumentation 
itself (Eemeren, 2014, p. 19). 
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military action is a well-received explanation internationally, the benefits of the EU to stress 
such an explanation seems reasonable. However, looking at the historical explanation on 
some of the factors resulting in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the earlier 
relationships between the Ukrainian government and the EU seems to play an important role. 
This relationship has however not been brought up by the EU. In addition to the arguments 
highlighted by the EU themselves, therefore, I will allow an own section to the unspoken 
premise that I believe plays a distinct part in the view of Ukrainian sovereignty held by the 
EU. 
Ukraine and the Eurasian Union 
The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) is a union that was created in February 2012 
consisting of three countries: Russia, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
Similar to the EU, the EEC is focused on increased trade, integration and economic 
cooperation within its union (The Eurasian Economic Commission, n.d.) with the goal of 
achieving a free flow of people, capital, goods and services. Looking to reconnect the 
cooperation with the countries that gained independence from the Soviet Union, the union has 
been in discussions with Ukraine since the dissolution. (The Eurasian Economic Commission, 
2014, p. 6) 
The Eurasian Union is described by the EU as “unlikely to bring long-term economic benefits 
to its members” since the countries suggested a membership has “more to gain by integrating 
with the outside world than with each other”. The Security Council also states that nations 
entering the EEC will lose their the political autonomy. Moreover, EU stresses the importance 
of ensuring that Russia follow the rules of the WTO and respects the sovereignty of its 
member countries by keeping an ongoing dialogue. (Dreyer & Nicu, 2014, pp. 1, 4) The 
sovereignty loss referred to by the EU is most likely the increased border-flows and decreased 
legislative authority that an eventual membership in the EEC would contribute to. In other 
words, the argument used by the EU regarding the downsides of Ukraine entering the 
partnership are similar to the arguments that could also be used when claiming the loss of 
sovereignty that a possible membership in the EU could result in. Although not in any way 
identical, the EU and the EEC are both international organisations which can be associated 
with a sovereignty loss similar to the one describes in Krasner’s definition of interdependence 
sovereignty. 
Taking interdependence sovereignty into the discussion of Ukrainian sovereignty provides 
another dimension to the role of the EU in the Ukrainian conflict. Although representing 
another view on what type of sovereignty that might be threatened in terms of Krasner’s 
model, both of the definitions are connected to the identity of Ukraine. For the EU, Russia 
entering Ukraine means a risk of them affecting the Westphalian and the domestic sovereignty 
of the nation. As established earlier, this could affect the Ukrainian stance on an EU 
membership. Hence, these developments could contribute to a change of the national identity 
of Ukraine. The loss of interdependence sovereignty that a membership in the EEC could 
bring might therefore be a bigger dilemma for the EU. However, unless adding a cultural 
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dimension of national sovereignty, such connections are difficult to make. Looking at 
sovereignty only in terms of Krasner’s model, therefore, might not be enough. 
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Discussion 
Judging by the display of my textual analysis, there are two main claims made by the EU. The 
first is that national sovereignty should be respected and not be undermined. The second is 
that by the use of sanctions the EU should control the behaviour of Russia. I will not further 
elaborate the first claim. Instead, I will concentrate on the second one, trying to connect the 
statement with a discussion of Ukrainian sovereignty and how this can be connected to the 
EU. Brought forward in this discussion will be the model presented by Krasner which I find 
helpful in explaining how different dimensions of sovereignty can be exemplified through the 
separate elements of the Ukrainian conflict. Adopting these to a broader picture will however 
demand an approach that can offer an explanation to how and why it is in the interest of the 
EU to condemn Russian behaviour according to these terms. By adapting the theoretical 
framework developed by Rudolph, I will attempt to include such an approach by discussing 
the relevance of social sovereignty.  
Looking at the arguments made by the EU between the justifications of using sanctions 
towards Russia displays a clear picture of its view on Ukrainian sovereignty. As concluded in 
the textual analysis, the use terms such as “sovereignty”, “territorial integrity”, “territorial 
unity” and “independence” shows a mainly geopolitical approach to the conflict. In other 
words, Westphalian sovereignty seems to be the most accurate description of the loss of 
sovereignty that Ukraine has experienced due since Russian military entered Ukrainian 
territory. This does not however offer the broad picture, in which looking at the Eurasian 
Union and the way it is described by the EU as an eventual loss of “political autonomy” 
seems to refer more to a loss of control due to the increased border flows that would follow. 
According to the EU this would also include a threat of Ukrainian interdependence 
sovereignty. Using Krasner’s model, therefore, Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty 
seem to be the main threats to Ukraine’s supremacy according to the EU.  
Using Krasners model, it seems that it is mostly a matter of territory and capital. In fact, 
Krasner’s dimensions are representative of the separate discussions of sovereignty that are 
often brought out by liberalists and realists today. Focusing on the connection between the 
domestic and the international society, interdependence sovereignty provides the liberalist 
thoughts on the changing character of sovereignty. Concentrating instead on the importance of 
territory and borders, Westphalian democracy provides the classical thought on sovereignty 
provided by realists. In that matter, Krasner does not unify the discussion on sovereignty 
making it an integrated concept but rather allows a view on supremacy that will never allow 
the debate to come together. 
 Interdependence 
sovereignty 
Domestic 
sovereignty 
Legal 
sovereignty 
Westphalian 
sovereignty 
Security Material 
 
Societal  Geopolitical 
Figure 2 
Uniting the framework presented by Rudolph with the definitions provided by Krasner clearly 
displays how Krasner fail to take into account an important part of the political change that 
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exists due to globalisation. By combining Krasner’s definitions with the theory of Rudolph, 
the above presented figure is an attempt to display how their different frameworks interact. 
According to this model, the EU condemns Russian behaviour on two grounds: its threat 
towards Ukrainian material and geopolitical security. However, the change that a Ukrainian 
entrance into the EEC would bring about would also mean a cultural change that, according to 
Rudolph, is defining of a societal security change. Equalizing the societal change with the 
national identity (see figure 3) would provide a better way of explaining the change of 
sovereignty that Ukraine might face. 
 Interdependence 
sovereignty 
Domestic 
sovereignty 
Legal 
sovereignty 
Westphalian 
sovereignty 
Security Material 
 
Societal 
 
 Geopolitical 
 
Characteristics Capital, goods 
 
National 
identity 
Juridical 
recognition 
Territory 
Figure 3 
However, equalizing Krasner’s definition of domestic sovereignty with what Rudolph refers 
to as societal security is not really accurate. While domestic sovereignty means the 
authoritative legitimacy of a state within its borders, societal security is about the 
homogeneity of a domestic community. Excluding the dimensions of Krasner, therefore, 
would give us a more accurate picture in which a cultural dimension can be included without 
being connected to domestic sovereignty (figure 4). 
Security Material 
 
Societal 
 
(Legal) Geopolitical 
 
Characteristics Capital, goods 
 
National 
identity 
Juridical 
recognition 
Territory 
Figure 4 
Consequently it might be valid to suggest that Krasner take into consideration a view of 
sovereignty where the government, the ruling institution, is not the most legitimate. It might 
even be reasonable to add another dimension that looks beyond the state and to the citizen. 
After all, the development that we see today is a classic example of what Rudolph refers to as 
“sovereignty bargaining”. In terms of Krasner’s definitions, this means strengthening the 
domestic sovereignty by weakening the controlling dimension of the interdependence 
sovereignty. This results in a change of a national identity that is historically filled up by 
thoughts of borders and military security. Hence, the discussion about sovereignty is in fact a 
discussion about identity that is right now being torn between the national and global. This is 
creating an increased importance of borders since still today, IR scholars are sticking to a 
made up ideal of the nation-state. 
I would like to claim that an important part in the discussion about Ukrainian sovereignty is 
the question of identity and thereby allow a bigger role to the societal dimension of the 
discussion. But as Rudolph has concluded, societal security and societal sovereignty are two 
different concepts. Since societal security refers to a static, homogenous group, societal 
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sovereignty refers to a shifting national identity. The parallel drawn between societal security 
and national identity in figure 3 and 4 are therefore not unproblematic. 
It does however give us an idea of the thoughts behind one of the main claims made by the 
EU, namely why they should support Ukraine by controlling the behaviour of Russia. After 
all, larger unions such as the EU that started merely as economic cooperation have developed 
into more than just trade unions and are thus facing the same dilemma as the nation-states. I 
would argue that the real dilemma for the EU is in fact the impact that the Ukrainian conflict 
will have on the Ukrainian approach towards a future membership in the EU. This of course 
also questions figure 3 and its connection between the social sovereignty and the domestic 
society. Because must an identity be domestic?  
The behaviour of the EU in regards to the Ukrainian conflict is not that unlike the struggle for 
a social sovereignty within a nation-state. The EU has the same paradoxical view on 
sovereignty as do nations: the diversion of the inside and the outside, internal and external, us 
and them. In the end, it all becomes a discussion of the European identity, signified by the 
inside of EU versus outside of the EU. Thus the EU has adopted to the same ideal as the 
nations, which leads us to the conclusion that as a concept, sovereignty is not undergoing a 
major change. What is experiencing a difference is the national identity which, as Rudolph 
states, has went through a major change from the 17th until the 19
th
 century and is still today 
changing. 
Consequently, the discussion about Ukrainian sovereignty is in fact a discussion about 
Ukrainian identity. It seems sovereignty, as a concept, is merely used as a shield for 
monitoring the behaviour of states on the international arena. I will not speculate on whether 
or not Ukraine will become a part of the EU. I will, however, state that it is the wish of the 
EU, and that it seems like every move of the EU is vital for deciding whether or not they will 
succeed. It might therefore be irrelevant to discuss sovereignty the way Krasner attempt to do, 
simply because his definitions fails to address the real issue in terms of a national identity. 
Conclusion 
That the European Union displays a complex view on national sovereignty is not a new nor 
revolutionary claim. But it is not only its parliamentary structure that has made IR scholars to 
question the future of national sovereignty. As Krasner points out, national sovereignty is not 
an uncontested concept. The nation-state has never been fully sovereign in the traditional 
meaning, the Westphalian Treaty did not lay the groundwork for state autonomy, and as a 
concept sovereignty is an umbrella-term for several separate conditions. This means that as a 
concept, Stephen Krasner offers a clear model to explain sovereignty. In other words, he 
provides a helpful definition for describing how we look at the relationship between the 
nation-state and its surroundings within Western IR theory today. However, using his 
description of sovereignty in terms of domestic institutions and economic trade with the 
surrounding world does become static since it creates a notion of a country as an empty shell. 
As the Western World as we know it expands and interconnects, the importance of a certain 
identity grows stronger. The question on whether or not Ukraine should be independent is 
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therefore strongly connected to the question on whether they should become a part of the EU. 
None of these choices are value free but in fact a standpoint of which identity the Ukrainian 
people should adopt. The discussion of sovereignty, therefore, is not too different from earlier 
centuries. The paradoxical view on the nation state and its supremacy brought forward by the 
EU displays how sovereignty has always been about dichotomies. Whether in terms of 
territory, culture or national identity the one significant element of sovereignty, to include 
some by excluding others, is always present. 
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Appendix 
Argument analysis 
The argument analysis is centered on the Greek term logos, which means to try to logically 
persuade. It builds upon the ability of the receiving part to make rational conclusions out of a 
logic line of thoughts. (Boréus & Bergström, 2005, pp. 89-90) The analysis functions as a way 
to structure these thoughts in order to look at the cornerstones of the text written, which is the 
descriptive purpose of the analysis. (Boréus & Bergström, 2005, p. 91) It however also 
enables the user to discover and demonstrate the unexposed premises, which may be 
deliberately or unintentionally hidden, that holds the arguments together. (Boréus & 
Bergström, 2005, p. 103) Such hidden premises can - along with the arguments, the thesis and 
the visible premises – be validated in relation to norms, reasonability, rationality, evidential 
value and to what extent it fulfils the purpose of the text. (Boréus & Bergström, 2005, p. 91) 
However, I will not assay to what extent the arguments that I distinguish present valid points 
in terms of these aspects. As I have earlier pointed out, the purpose of this part of my essay is 
not to evaluate the arguments, but to display them. 
An argument analysis can be structured differently depending on its purpose, however the 
first step is always to look for a thesis in the text analysed. The thesis does not support nor 
disclaim any of the arguments displayed in the text but works as the purpose of which the 
arguments in the text relies on. (Boréus & Bergström, 2005, p. 96) These arguments, that will 
either confirm or disaffirm the thesis
5
, can be divided into different levels where the 
arguments of the first order are the ones meant to support the thesis. Consequently, the next 
level of arguments will support the arguments of the first order and the third level of 
arguments will support the arguments of the second order. (Boréus & Bergström, 2005, p. 
101) The arguments and/or thesis which allude to the logic ability of the reader to by oneself 
rationalize the linkage between, ergo the arguments that contain an unwritten premise, will be 
presented. (Boréus & Bergström, 2005, p. 103) These might need to be supported by a 
premise argument, which backs up the premise in the same way that the main arguments back 
up the thesis. (Boréus & Bergström, 2005, p. 109) 
                                                 
 
5
 It should be made clear that the arguments presented in “Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP” will not contain 
any counterarguments; hence I from this point on will speak only of arguments as supportive of the thesis. 
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Thesis: The European Union should impose sanctions towards Russia 
Premise: The EU should support/protect Ukraine 
Premise argument: Because of Russia’s unprovoked act 
First order argument: Russia has acted in dissidence with international rules 
Second order argument: Russia threatens the sovereignty of Ukraine 
Third order arguments: Threatens its 1) territorial integrity and 2) independence 
Premise 1: (Peaceful) negotiations is the right way to go 
Premise 2: This is against the Ukrainian Constitution (i.e. illegal) 
Arguments of fourth line: 1A) By the use of armed forces and 2A) by declaring a referendum 
Sanctions 
necessary 
Russia breaking 
international 
rules 
Ukrainian 
sovereignty 
Territorial 
integrity 
Armed forces 
Independence 
Referendum 
